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Barriers to Hospital Diversification: The Regulatory
Environment
Reed Hamilton*
The hospital industry, now as never before, is challenged by an
increasingly competitive but nevertheless highly regulated marketplace. Due to federally initiated regulatory and reimbursement
programs designed to achieve health care cost containment and efficient delivery of health services, the marketplace has been forced
to respond to the rapid rise in health care costs. These federal initiatives most notably include the Certificate of Need (CON) health
planning program1 and the Medicare and Medicaid health benefits
payment system. 2 As a result of changes in the administration of
these programs, hospitals have reevaluated their existing corporate
structures in order to become more competitive with other providers and to more effectively navigate within the regulatory environment. Typically, hospital responses include the establishment of
cost control mechanisms, the development of new streams of revenue, and the adoption of new methods of health care delivery, particularly outpatient care. A common corporate experience in the
hospital industry to achieve these results has been consolidation
and diversification. For many of these efforts, however, Certificate
of Need and Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse restrictions
present formidable barriers. Those barriers are the subject of this
article.
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE

In recent decades, the health care industry has experienced an
overwhelming rise in health care costs. Skyrocketing expenditures
* B.S., 1969,'Allegheny College; J.D., 1974, Temple University. Partner, Blank, Rome,
Comisky & McCauley, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6 (1982). For a description of the Certificate of Need (CON) regulations, see infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. I 1983); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396q (1982 &
Supp. I 1983). For a description of reimbursement under the Medicare and Medicaid programs, see infra notes 7 & 8, 24 & 25 and accompanying text.
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for health care cause concern to government payors, businesses, labor, consumers and providers. As a result, cost control has become
the driving force behind recent developments in the health care
delivery system. Efforts to contain rising costs have included extensive regulation and restrictive reimbursement. The emphasis in
delivery has now shifted from expensive inpatient services to less
costly outpatient services. To accommodate this shift, many new
and alternative delivery and financing systems are developing. The
regulatory environment is also changing, but not always in directions compatible with new and existing reimbursement incentives.
A brief history of the payment and regulatory systems will help
explain how the industry arrived at its current position.
A.

Health Planning and Reimbursement: The Delivery System
Grows

Major health planning efforts began at the federal level with
adoption of the Hill-Burton Act.$ Adopted in 1946, the Act represented a congressional directive to expand inpatient capacity in order to provide citizens throughout the country with greater access
to health care services. The Hill-Burton Act provided low interest
loans, loan guarantees, and outright grants for the development of
new public and voluntary non-profit hospitals and nursing homes."
As a condition for receipt of Hill-Burton funds, hospitals had to
make free and low cost health care available to indigents who otherwise could not afford to obtain care. 5 As intended, inpatient capacity grew rapidly during the 1950's and 1960's.
Even with this expanded availability of health facilities, however, the federal government wanted further assurances that the
indigent and elderly would have access to health care services.
With a focus on the indigent and elderly, Congress then passed
Social Security Act amendments in 1965,' thus establishing the
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement programs. Medicare and
3. Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o-1 (1982)). This act is also referred to as the
Hill-Burton Act.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 291-291o-1 (1982). The Hill-Burton Act was adopted to address the
shortage of hospital beds after World War II. Id. The Act established a federal-state partnership and provided grants to states for surveying state needs and developing state plans
for the construction of voluntary non-profit and public hospitals. Id. The grants were also
used to help construct and equip such facilities. Id.
5. Id.
6. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
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Medicaid provided the mechanism by which health care facilities
would be reimbursed for the reasonable costs incurred in caring for
eligible individuals.7 The "cost based" payment methodology
adopted by these programs provided reimbursement for both operating and capital costs, with capital costs being reimbursed virtually on a dollar for dollar pass-through.8 As such, the capital passthrough provided still another stimulus to the growth of inpatient
capacity.
The cost-based payment methodology, however, provided no incentives for facilities to control costs. As a result, the Medicare and
Medicaid budgets expanded rapidly. Labor and other operating
costs increased generally, and capital expenditures supported by
long-term debt spiralled. Medicare and Medicaid and the growth
of other third party private insurance programs provided no reason
for the recipients or patients to become cost-conscious health care
consumers. The recipients of the Medicare and Medicaid programs
were, in effect, insulated from bearing the financial burden of medical costs. That, of course, was the intended purpose of these programs. Rarely did recipients have more than a token economic incentive to make cost-conscious purchasing decisions. The absence
of cost sensitivity among purchasers contributed to the inflation of
health care costs.
Another factor contributing to the rise in health care costs was
the patient's psychological and physical dependence on his physi7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. I 1983). Medicare is an exclusively federal
program providing two types of health insurance for eligible elderly and other individuals
under which physicians, hospitals and other providers are reimbursed for covered services
provided to the Medicare beneficiaries. Id. Reimbursement is provided for inpatient hospitals, skilled nursing, home health and related care under Part A of the program. 42 C.F.R. §§
405.100-405.196 (1984). Physicians' services and other medical services are provided under
Part B of the program. Id.
Medicaid, otherwise known as the Medical Assistance program, is funded by the federal
government and the states. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396zz (1982 & Supp. I 1983). Recipients
under the program are impoverished individuals who are aged, blind or disabled, or members of families with dependent children. Id. Each state operates a Medicaid program according to the state rules. See, e.g., 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 441.1-447 (Purdon Supp.
1985) for Pennsylvania's program rules.
8. Under both the Medicare and Medicaid programs as originally enacted, providers
were reimbursed the lesser of their customary charges or their reasonable costs incurred in
providing covered services. 42 C.F.R. § 405.451 (1984). Although facilities were restricted in
their reimbursement to those costs necessary and reasonable to treatment, there were no
real incentives to decreasing costs or limiting spending. Id. The regulations did not tag a
particular service with a specific dollar amount. Id. Therefore, while one facility recovered
one amount for a particular service, another may have been reimbursed for an entirely different sum depending on the hospital's costs. Id.
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cian. This dependence normally precluded the patient from identifying and using cost-efficient alternative methods of treatment.
The physician, therefore, was able to dictate not only treatment
methods, but he could also demand that a medical facility provide
equipment and services that he considered vital for the patient's
care without consideration as to the cost or other resources
involved.
In sum, Medicare, Medicaid, and other third party insurance
created a market force for uninhibited growth and utilization of
medical facilities, equipment and services with little or no cost sensitivity. Under such conditions, the health care marketplace, unlike
most marketplaces, lacked forces promoting natural competition.
As a result, there were no internal mechanisms working to control
costs. An outside effort would be required to promote cost
containment.
B. Early Cost Containment: Capital Expenditure Controls
The first major effort at cost containment was the federally initiated health planning and capital expenditure review program established by amendments to the Social Security Act in 1972, commonly referred to as section 1122. 9 Section 1122 was enacted to
assure that federal Medicare and Medicaid funds were not used to
support unnecessary capital expenditures which previously had
been reimbursable in the cost-based system on a pass-through basis.10 Section 1122 introduced a capital expenditure review program requiring advance notice from facilities prior to any capital
expenditures in excess of $100,000, or prior to other capital expenditures which would result in changes to bed capacity or health
services offered by institutions. Notice would be given to state and
regional planning agencies which would then recommend to the
U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW)
whether to approve reimbursement for that portion of depreciation
and interest expenses incurred in the treatment of recipients of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.
9. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1386 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1320 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1320 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). Under the section 1122 program, health
care facilities were not reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid for depreciation, interest or
return in equity capital relating to capital expenditures which regional health planning
agencies found to be inconsistent with the health needs of the community. Id. With the
advent of the section 1122 program, expenditures under Medicare and Medicaid for the first
time were related to state health planning. Id.
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The section 1122 program, however, was voluntary among the
states. States were not required to enter into an agreement with
HEW to review the proposed expenditures and make such recommendations. In non-participating states, facilities were not obligated to give advance notice and did not have to receive approval
of HEW to be eligible for reimbursement of capital expenditures
under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. In states that did
participate, regional comprehensive health planning agencies conducted reviews of proposed expenditures to see whether they were
needed by the community and were financially feasible. Those
planning agencies then made a recommendation to a designated
state health planning agency which in turn made a recommendation to HEW as to whether capital reimbursement should be withheld or allowed.
In those states which participated in the program, if a health
care facility was not reviewed under section 1122, the facility was
unable to receive reimbursement for that portion of the depreciation and interest expenses associated with the care of Medicare
and Medicaid recipients. A health care facility that failed to obtain
a section 1122 review, or which obtained a review but failed to receive a recommendation of approval from the designated state
planning agency, was not prohibited from incurring the expenditure. Rather, the facility was merely prohibited from obtaining
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. Many facilities were willing to suffer this penalty and proceed without the approvals. Thus,
the section 1122 review program was often ineffective. A more rigorous cost control program was needed. Certificate of Need was
thought to be the answer.1
The Certificate of Need program was established by the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act in 1974
(National Health Planning Act). 2 Patterned after the section 1122
program, the Certificate of Need (CON) program required review
and approval of capital expenditures in excess of $150,000, the offering of new clinical health services, and the acquisition of major
medical equipment used to serve inpatients.13 Unlike section 1122,
however, CON programs were not voluntary among the states.
States were compelled to establish a CON review program or face
the loss of millions of dollars in federal public health allocations.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6 (1982).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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The National Health Planning Act established State Health Planning and Development Agencies (SHPDAs) and Health Systems
Agencies (HSAs) to administer the programs. Those agencies were
obligated to undertake a comprehensive assessment of community
health needs, to develop long-range State Health Plans and regional Health Systems Plans which established goals and standards for health care services, and to review and approve only
those proposed health facility expenditures and services which
were consistent with those standards." In most instances, these
functions were similar to those performed during the section 1122
program by the state and regional comprehensive health planning
agencies. Unlike section 1122, however, the CON program absolutely prohibited health care facilities from obligating any expenditures or offering a new service without first obtaining the required
CON approval. Persons or facilities who did proceed without CON
approval could be fined, enjoined from further activity, and could
suffer loss of their license to operate.15 This, in contrast, was a far
more serious penalty than the inability to obtain reimbursement
for depreciation and interest expenses for the treatment of Medicare and Medicaid recipients, the penalty imposed under section
1122. CON, as intended, clearly imposed a major barrier to the development of the health care delivery system, a perceived goal of
cost containment initiatives. In the 1950's and 1960's, growth was
stimulated. In the 1970's, growth was deterred.
C.

CON in Detail

The new CON program requires that the offering or establishment of a "new institutional health service" first receive CON approval.1 6 New institutional health services are defined by federal
regulations as follows: (1) the obligation of a capital expenditure
"by or on behalf of" a health care facility in excess of the capital
expenditure threshold periodically adjusted by the federal government;'" (2) the offering of a new clinical health service not previously offered within the previous twelve months, if it is associated
with any capital expenditure or with an annual operating expense
in excess of the operating expenditure threshold which is also peri14.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-1 - 3001-5 (1982).
15. 42 C.F.R. § 123.408 (1985).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6 (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300rn-6, 300n(6) (1982). The threshold, originally set at $150,000, is
now $736,200. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6 (1982).
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odically adjusted by the federal government;"8 (3) the termination
of a health service associated with any capital expenditure; ' 9 (4) a
change in bed capacity, a relocation of beds, or a redistribution of
beds from one category to another, except those changes that constitute less than 10 beds or 10 percent of total capacity, whichever
is less;20 and (5) the acquisition of major medical equipment if it
will be owned by or located within a health care facility, or is not
owned by a health facility, if it will be used to serve inpatients.2 1
As administered by the various SHPDAs and HSAs, these "new
institutional health services" can be further defined or interpreted
in a highly restrictive manner. Such restrictive definitions can seriously impede management flexibility and institutional development. "Clinical health services," for example, can be defined variously to require CON review for the extension of a service into
different diagnostic or treatment modalities, even where a pre-existing department or service within the hospital had been established to treat patients for those conditions in the past. To illustrate, there are in Pennsylvania at least ten separate radiology
services for which a separate CON review as a new clinical health
service is required.
The CON review process is extremely cumbersome and often political. It may involve a substantial degree of bargaining with HSA
and SHPDA staff members on institutional services and activities
which may or may not be related to the specific project under consideration. The CON reviews themselves routinely take from six to
nine months. Moreover, when all application fees, consulting fees,
and other associated costs are totalled, the reviews can be extremely expensive. Finally, even those facilities which receive CON
approval may face challenges from competitors who can appeal the
approval for additional administrative and judicial review, thus
frustrating the CON holder from proceeding with development. A
project can be held up for years in litigation, a condition which
often makes it impossible to obtain financing for the project.
In the end, the powerful institutions with greater political clout
tend to receive approval, albeit with considerable bargaining of
costs and services during the process. Smaller, less influential institutions, and projects with a lesser impact on overall health care
18.
$297,500.
19.
20.
21.

42 U.S.C. § 300m-6 (1982). The threshold, originally set at $75,000, is now
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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costs, tend to receive a disproportionate share of the disapprovals.
Nursing homes, for example, are more likely to suffer disapprovals
than the more powerful hospitals. Thus, notwithstanding the substantial barrier CON poses to new development, there is a widespread belief that the CON program, as with the section 1122 program before it, failed to control escalating health care costs. Those
costs continued to increase in spite of regulatory review pursuant
to section 1122 and CON. Moreover, the burden of high health
care cost continued, of course, to fall heavily upon the Medicare
and Medicaid programs, and ultimately, upon the taxpayers. New
approaches to cost containment would be needed.
II.

THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: DELIVERY INCENTIVES
CHANGE

The cost-based payment methodology for reimbursing health
care facilities was perceived to be the fundamental obstacle to effective cost containment. Its adverse incentives contributed to increased spending, notwithstanding section 1122 and CON. While
this problem had been recognized for years, a major overhaul of
that system had not been contemplated. Instead, savings were
achieved through piecemeal changes to the reimbursement system.
The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (PaDPW), for example, placed a $22,000 per bed ceiling on capital reimbursement
for new nursing home beds.22 PaDPW also began to interpret existing regulations more restrictively.2 3 More fundamental changes
in reimbursement policy, however, would be necessary to bring
about more meaningful cost containment.
The revolutionary breakthrough in reimbursement policy occurred in 1983 with the establishment of the Prospective Payment
System (PPS) for inpatient hospital care. 4 Medicare discarded the
22. 55 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 1181.259(s) (Shepard's 1983). The pertinent code section
reads, "After July 1, 1977, allowable depreciation costs for existing new, renovated repurchased facilities shall be limited to a maximum construction cost per bed of $22,000." Id.
23. In one situation, PaDPW completely revised its audit policy with respect to the
interpretation of a regulation mandating the recapture of depreciation of a facility when
sold for a profit. The regulation provided that gains were an allowable cost up to 10% of the
depreciation, an ambiguous provision at best. For years, PaDPW had used this provision to
recover 10% of the depreciation that had been paid to the facility during its last year of
operation by the seller. In what appeared to be an effort to save money, PaDPW simply
revised its audit policy without amending the regulation to recover 90% of the depreciation
paid to the facility in that last year prior to the sale.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.470-405.477 (1983). The fundamental
purpose of PPS is to change the incentives facing hospitals in order to increase the efficiency with which they produce care for patients and with which they use other elements of
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cost-based reimbursement system and substituted a system which
permits hospitals to recover a fixed amount per inpatient admission, depending on the principal diagnosis of the case, not on the
costs incurred in providing care. This changed the entire system of
financial incentives by which hospitals would deliver services to
Medicare recipients.
Pursuant to the PPS legislation, each patient admitted to a hospital would be classified in one of 467 Diagnosis Related Groups
(DRG) that were established. Each was assigned a relative value or
weighing factor used to determine the final dollar amounts to be
paid for each of the possible 467 DRG cases. The length of stay or
actual cost for treating a patient did not affect the payment
amount, except in rare instances where the length of stay was extremely long or the cost extremely high. In those so-called outlier
cases, an additional payment amount is allowed. Many states have
followed the Medicare lead by adopting a DRG-based payment
system for their Medicaid programs.
This radical change in the payment system now provides hospitals with incentives to cut costs by reducing length of stay and by
reducing unnecessary ancillary services. The incentives encourage
hospitals to discharge patients as early as medically possible, to
identify and eliminate the use of unnecessary tests and procedures,
and to utilize lower cost outpatient services and freestanding facilities to the maximum extent possible. ' As a result, hospitals will be
discharging patients to hospices, nursing homes, and home health
care as promptly as possible.
To assure the availability of other such providers for their patients, hospitals can either acquire a facility, establish a facility of
the health care delivery system. Id. Under the PPS system, hospitals are to be paid a fixed
price for a Medicare case, defined by Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). Id. Therefore, if
hospitals are able to provide care for less than the associated DRG fixed price, they will
retain more net income. Id.
Under PPS, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the agency which administers the Medicare program, uses the principal diagnosis to assign patients to DRGs. Id.
The principal diagnosis is defined as the condition most responsible for the admission of the
patient. Id. Therefore, if a Medicare patient has a number of diagnoses and the one defined
as most responsible for admission is less expensive than one identified later, the hospital
may be underpaid significantly. Id. Thus arises the critical issue of managing physicians so
that they appropriately identify the principal diagnosis.
25. Under PPS, hospitals attempt to reduce the number of hospital inpatient days per
patient because the hospital is receiving a fixed sum for a predetermined number of inpatient days per case. Therefore, if the hospital is able to discharge a patient a day earlier
than that associated with the appropriate DRG, the hospital will still recover the same
amount from HCFA. Reduction in lengths of stay has become a major cause of reduced
costs and therefore increased net income under PPS.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:425

their own, or contract with existing facilities. Hospitals will also
want to increase admissions to help fill the empty beds resulting
from the earlier discharge of patients. Some hospitals may want to
reduce bed capacity or discontinue unnecessary and non-profitable
services. Others will want to add new services or develop new facilities such as nursing homes and home health agencies to accomplish these objectives. The competition among hospitals for more
patients and for more efficient delivery systems will be keen. As
can be seen, PPS holds the possibility of restoring traditional market forces to control costs.
Unfortunately, these market forces and the industry response to
them, all of which may be appropriate and desirable, may be subject to barriers posed by CON. CON will make many of the new
arrangements desired by hospitals considerably more difficult and
time-consuming to implement. Moreover, the competitive response
by one facility may be met by challenges, during the CON process,
from the community of other competitors who do not understand
or consider the financial implications facing the institution. 26
In response to PPS, hospitals will also seek to broaden their referral base by strengthening ties with admitting physicians. To do
so, they will enter into joint ventures with physicians to establish
outpatient clinics or home health agencies and similar organizations in targeted service areas where additional referrals might be
generated.2 7 CON, licensure, and reimbursement regulations will
all impact on these activities.2" As will be discussed more fully
later in this article, regulatory restrictions against referrals must
also be examined carefully to avoid criminal fraud and abuse violations under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.2 9 Moreover,
those programs impose strict ownership reporting requirements or
limitations. 0 These limitations are in many respects, incompatible
with other aspects of the reimbursement system which foster these
developments.
III.

MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

In order to maintain or increase their patient market share, hos26. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
27. For a description of the joint ventures that hospitals and physicians may be entering, see infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. For a detailed analysis of the fraud and abuse issues, see infra notes 62-93 and
accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., 55 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 1101.43 (Shepard's 1985).

Regulatory Barriers

1985

pitals are being forced by PPS to examine their competitive position in the health care marketplace. A strong hospital management
team with strategic planning goals will be necessary. The management response of many hospitals has included major corporate reorganization. Reorganization has been achieved by having hospitals
participate in the establishment of new health care providers
which serve as part of a multi-institutional system. Among other
functions, the system provides facilities and services to patients after discharge from a hospital. This type of arrangement not only
enlarges the patient referral base, but it also enhances the revenue
generating potential of the multi-institutional system. These
multi-institutional systems often include outpatient providers and
hospital/physician joint ventures. Once again, however, the barriers
of CON may be raised to frustrate management.
A.

Efficiency and Diversification

Although not all payors have discontinued cost-based reimbursement, the impact of the Medicare PPS program has forced hospitals into more businesslike practices. Unlike the cost-based payment system, the DRG payment system no longer rewards
management inefficiencies. Physicians must also be educated regarding the effect of their practice on hospital costs. The physician's role in cost containment is critical. It is the physician who
admits patients, orders tests, prescribes medications, orders surgery and discharges the patient. These activities will drive up or
cut down on costs. An effective management relationship between
the hospital and medical staff will be vital to cost control and survival in the marketplace.
An effective hospital/physician relationship must include privately imposed regulatory mechanisms within a hospital to control
utilization of hospital facilities. Utilization review committees will
scrutinize physician activity to determine whether routine tests
and procedures ordered by physicians are medically necessary and
are cost effective. Physicians will also be asked to complete medical records more accurately and in a more timely fashion. Hospital
management will have to work jointly and cooperatively with their
medical staffs to implement these controls while at the same time
maintaining the quality of care provided.
While hospitals must enhance their relationships with the medical staff, they must also work with the medical staff on strategic
planning to develop new methods of health care delivery and new
revenue streams. PPS with fixed, often limited, reimbursement for
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inpatient health care services compels hospitals to develop new
product lines.3 ' Slowly, the traditional community hospital is being
replaced by multihospital systems. This move toward consolidation
brings together economies of scale and provides a stronger base for
diversification and reorganization-"
Diversification of hospital services often includes both the development of new types of health care providers and also participation in alternate delivery systems. New service providers include
Home Health Agencies, 3s Urgicenters,3' 4 Ambulatory Surgical Centers, 5 Birth Centers, 6 and Dialysis Centers. 7 Alternate delivery
systems generally refer to Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs)," s Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), 39 Exclusive
Provider
Organizations
(EPOs) ,'40 and
Health
Insuring
4
Organizations. 1
31. For a description of the prospective payment system, see supra notes 24-30 and
accompanying text.
32. See ERNST & WHINNEY, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1983). Of the 155 hospital
respondents who had reorganized their corporate structure, the single most important reason for the initial decision to reorganize was reimbursement problems. Id. at 14-15. A significant number of respondents also cited economic needs and avoidance of government regulation as primary reasons for reorganization. Id. But surprisingly, the survey indicated that
reimbursement maximization and CON avoidance were not the most significant benefits realized from reorganizations. Id. at 16-17.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(o) (1982). A home health agency is one which provides nursing
and other therapeutic services to disabled or injured persons in their place of residence.
34. The term "urgicenter" refers to a variety of freestanding medical offices that provide physician services.
35. The term "ambulatory surgical center" refers to a facility which provides selective
surgical care on an outpatient basis.
36. The term "birth center" refers to a distinct facility which provides services to
pregnant women.
37. The term "dialysis center" refers to a facility separate and apart from any other
facility which provides renal dialysis to persons with kidney disease.
38. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) enroll subscribers for a premium
much like a traditional insurance company, but services are provided by a closed group of
providers and referrals to hospitals and specialists are carefully controlled by a primary care
physician. The subscriber patient loses freedom to choose a physician outside the HMO
group. Payment to the primary care physician is based on a fixed amount or capital fee for
each subscriber, not on a fee-for-service billing basis.
39. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) are a-series of contractual relationships
between payors and providers with an intermediary often serving as a third party broker
and administrator. At a minimum, the essential contractual characteristics will include the
subscriber freedom of choice, the subscriber incentives to choose a preferred lower cost provider, and discounts by the preferred provider from normal fee-for-service payment basis.
40. Exclusive Provider Organizations (EPOs) are more similar to PPOs than HMOs in
their structural characteristics. However, under an EPO, the patient/subscriber is required
to use the exclusive provider and loses any freedom of choice. The patient/subscriber pays
on a discounted fee-for-service basis, thereby avoiding HMO characteristics.
41. A Health Insuring Organization (HIO) is a health delivery system authorized by
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Participation in alternate delivery systems will help strengthen
the patient referral base and may itself generate a new source of
revenue. HMOs are generally regulated by state health and insurance departments. PPOs, a new financing system in the marketplace, are generally not subject to well-defined regulatory controls.4 This does not, however, ease the burden for the hospital
planner or lawyer developing a PPO. Those organizing a PPO must
be sensitive to regulations governing both insurance companies and
HMOs to avoid regulatory provisions applicable to those financing
systems. The lawyer organizing a PPO must also be alert to antitrust and CON issues. The structural characteristics of an EPO are
similar to that of a PPO. With an EPO, however, the subscriber
patient is required to use the exclusive provider and loses freedom
of choice.
B.

The Regulatory Environment for New Providers

The development of new types of health care providers and alternate delivery systems has generated new regulatory concerns
which the existing regulatory structure does not adequately address. For one, the agencies charged with administering the existing regulatory programs may not adequately coordinate regulatory policy with the new hospital management activities taking
place in the industry. It was, after all, the adoption of PPS and
other cost containment legislation which encouraged hospitals to
offer a diversity of care in alternate settings.
The CON program remains a barrier to many of these developments. For example, the establishment of a new health care facility
generally requires a CON.4 3 The types of health care facilities covered by this requirement vary from state to state, but most include
hospitals, skilled or intermediate care nursing homes, ambulatory
surgical centers, kidney disease treatment centers or freestanding
hemodialysis units.
In many instances, statutory provisions as to whether a facility
requires a CON may be ambiguous, thus complicating both the atthe federal government to provide care to Medicaid recipients on a capitation payment
basis.
42. The legal problems that must be addressed in organizing a PPO are numerous.
The organization might consider the need for possible governmental approvals like CON
and the necessity of meeting certain securities requirements. Tax and malpractice issues
may also be a key concern to a PPO. The organization may have difficulty defining the
extent of physician liability.
43. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.701 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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torney's and management's role. Not always clearly subject to review are projects involving the establishment of home health agencies, drug and alcohol treatment facilities, birth centers, hospices,
urgicenters or primary care diagnostic facilities, and laboratories or
other medical testing facilities. In Pennsylvania, for example, the
establishment of a freestanding home health agency does not require a CON. 4' In Florida it does. Moreover, in Florida, the expansion of services by a home health agency into a new county not
previously served requires a CON."4
Another example is instructive. The Pennsylvania Department
of Health has placed hospitals and freestanding facilities on a level
of parity, pursuant to a policy which does not characterize the establishment of hospital based home health services as the addition
of a new clinical health service requiring a CON. In this instance,
the regulatory agency has adapted to the incentives of PPS and
has removed regulatory barriers so that hospitals may respond accordingly. Conversely, the establishment of a freestanding birth
center does not require a CON in Pennsylvania, but the establishment of a hospital based birth center is treated as the addition of a
new service which does require a CON." As can be seen from this,
not all policies will be consistent, and not all facilities will be
treated with parity.
Although thought by many to be cost effective, the development
of hospital based ambulatory surgical programs may also face regulatory barriers. CONs are generally required for both freestanding
ambulatory surgical centers and the establishment of hospital
based ambulatory surgical services. Until just recently, again using
Pennsylvania as the example, the Pennsylvania Department of
Health considered the need for ambulatory surgical suites on the
same basis as the need for hospital inpatient operating rooms. This
was done due to the fact that there were no provisions in either the
Health Systems Plans or the State Health Plan for separate consideration of ambulatory surgical capacity. Thus, because of excess
hospital inpatient operating room capacity, it appeared likely that
CON approval for ambulatory operating room capacity would be
difficult to obtain. Once again, the potential regulatory problems
facing prudent hospital diversification are apparent.
44.

28 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 401.2 (Shepard's 1984).
45. Home Health Professional Servs., Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitation
Servs., 463 So. 2d 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
46. The Pennsylvania Health Care Facilities Act does not define a freestanding birth
center as a new health service. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.701 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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While hospitals will nevertheless be exploring the possibility of
providing a wide range of new services in response to PPS, rehabilitation and psychiatric services deserve special attention. These
latter services are not included in PPS when they are provided in
"discrete" rehabilitation or psychiatric units. Rehabilitation and
psychiatric care provided in discrete units will remain subject to
cost-based reimbursement by the Medicare and Medicaid programs in most states. Hospitals currently providing those services
have consequently sought to qualify as discrete units to obtain the
more favorable cost-based reimbursement.
SHPDAs, however, may take the position that the establishment
of a discrete unit requires a CON, even where those services have
been provided by the hospital in the past in nondesignated beds.
This creates a serious burden to hospitals providing comprehensive
rehabilitation or psychiatric care and is entirely inconsistent with
the incentives of PPS. Where hospitals might have been providing
rehabilitation and psychiatric care in medical/surgical beds, they
now must establish a discrete segregated unit or otherwise forgo
favorable reimbursement. The inability to obtain a CON could
force hospitals to discontinue those services.
Moreover, CON approvals for those discrete units may be difficult to obtain. Rigorous opposition by competitors can be expected, and often, as in the ambulatory surgical area, standards of
need by which to evaluate the CON applications may not have
been incorporated into the Health Systems Plans or the State
Health Plan.
In addition, hospitals should not hesitate to challenge a finding
that they must obtain a CON in such instances. Until a recent decision of the administration hearing board in Pennsylvania, hospitals were required to appeal the determination that the establishment of a discrete unit required a CON within thirty days of that
determination.4 7 Often, such challenges had to be made before the
actual CON application was reviewed. Failure to timely appeal forfeited the right to challenge the issue of reviewability. 48 In the recent decision of In re: College Hill Medical Center,49 however, the
47.

See In re: Wesley Manor Health Care, Inc., 1 STATE HEALTH FACILITY HEARING
8 (1981). Under the Wesley Manor decision, if a facility in Pennsylvania did not
appeal a PaDOH Determination of Reviewability within 30 days of its issuance, it forfeited
any future right to appeal the initial determination of whether the project was subject to
CON review. Id.
48. Id.
49. CN 84-017, 84-018, decided by the Pennsylvania State Health Facility Hearing
BOARD
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board ruled that the failure to appeal a determination of reviewability within thirty days of its issuance does not prohibit a facility
from raising that issue on any subsequent appeal from a decision
on the merits of the CON application."
C.

CON and Corporate Reorganization

Thus far we have emphasized that PPS encourages hospital diversification. Corporate restructuring has often been necessary to
accommodate the multiple facilities services that result from diversification. As with those specific instances discussed above, however, corporate restructuring in the hospital industry faces significant CON barriers. Although many health care consultants have
suggested that CON restrictions can be avoided through a reorganization, this is not always so. In most states, CON statutes have a
provision consistent with federal regulations that requires a CON
for "[t]he obligation by or on behalf of a health care facility of any
capital expenditure" that exceeds the threshold amount.5 1 The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) analysis of this
regulation, as published in the Federal Register, suggests that expenditures by parent holding companies should not be considered
as undertaken "on behalf of" a health care subsidiary unless either
inpatient revenues are used to finance the capital expenditure or
health care services will be provided to inpatients.5 2 This narrow
construction does not discourage corporate restructuring and nonpatient care activities can be developed by sister subsidiaries of
hospitals without having to obtain a CON. Unfortunately, the
states have not been as narrow in their interpretation.
The Pennsylvania SHPDA was among the first to develop a formal policy with respect to corporate restructuring and the interpretation of the "by or on behalf of" clause. 53 It was determined
Board on May 15, 1985.
50. Id.

51. 42 C.F.R. § 123.404(a)(1) .(1985). See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.701(a)(3)
(Purdon Supp. 1985) (description of new institutional services subject to CON review; includes certain activities taken by or on behalf of a health care facility).
52. 48 Fed. Reg. at 39,752 (1983).
53. Health care facilities are advised to examine regulatory agencies' internal memo
and criteria in depth. Not all policies regarding CON review will be set forth in formal
regulations. The Pennsylvania Department of Health has published various policy guidelines for a number of topics, not all of which are codified in official publications. See e.g.,
Certificate of Need Memorandum CON-82-06, "Reviewability of Corporate Restructuring,"
January 8, 1982, reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE, No. 1985-305, JOINT VENTURES
IN HEALTH CARE

154-55 (1985).
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that the presence of certain factors would likely lead to the conclusion that an activity was being undertaken "on behalf of" a health
care facility and that a CON would, therefore, be required. 4 These
factors include the following:
1. The health care facility controls the new corporation, control being defined as the power to influence directly or indirectly the actions of the new
corporation;
2. A one-third overlap of the boards of directors, and the presence of common officers;
3. The utilization of common employees;
4. The use of patient revenues to support the development or operation of
the activity in question;
5. A contribution by the health care facility of one-third or more of the
assets or acquisition costs of the new corporation or activity;
6. The health care facility guarantees financing in excess of the capital expenditure threshold; and
7. The activity in question benefits the health care facility."

Many of these factors will be difficult to avoid in a normal hospital
reorganization where a parent holding company is created and new
subsidiaries are formed for each new product line or service.
Corporate reorganization does provide some advantage with respect to CON review of capital expenditures in excess of the current threshold of $736,200. 5" As noted previously, expenditures in
excess of that amount incurred by the hospital directly would generally require CON approval. Pursuant to a reorganization, however, a subsidiary of a parent holding company could incur the expenditure and possibly avoid CON review as an activity being
undertaken "by or on behalf of" the hospital subsidiary, especially
if the new activity is one not geared to providing health services.
Beware, however, of activities in which any services will be provided to patients.
In Pennsylvania, health care facilities have been put on notice
that they should not look to corporate reorganization as a means to
avoid CON review. The only sure way to avoid CON review is to
create a truly independent corporation over which the hospital will
have no direct or indirect control. The establishment of such a cor54.

Certificate of Need Policy Memorandum CON-82-06, "Reviewability of Corporate

Restructuring," January 8, 1982, reprinted in
JOINT VENTURES IN HEALTH CARE 154-55

PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE,

No. 1985-305,

(1985).

55. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 330m-6 (1982). The federal CON laws and regulations set forth the
threshold amount that will trigger CON review. These numbers are indexed according to
inflammatory rates and the cost of providing services.
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poration, however, may not be possible with the typical hospital
where its board is unwilling to relinquish that control. Even where
control is relinquished, a risk remains that CON review could be
premised on any benefit derived by the hospital from an activity of
the independent corporation. Such is the basis for the CON review
of hospital services provided pursuant to contract. A contractual
relationship with the independent corporation for the provision of
services to the hospital might be subject to review as the introduction of a new clinical health service by the hospital. Clearly, interpretation of the phrase "by or on behalf of" a health care facility
leaves much discretion to the SHPDAs, many of which remain aggressive administrators of CON review as a cost containment
method.
One type of reorganization which often can reduce the potential
for CON review is one in which a parent holding company is created, with a Board of Directors only partially overlapping that of
the hospital. New subsidiaries are then created as needed to conduct otherwise non-reviewable activities. The Board of the subsidiary will overlap with that of the parent, but not that of the hospital. Thus, the parent, not the hospital, controls the subsidiary.
Similarly, major medical equipment, such as magnetic resonance
imaging equipment, could be acquired through a subsidiary corporation without acquiring a CON if it is not used to treat inpatients
and does not meet the "on behalf of" test. 57 It is best for hospitals
to address the factors that might trigger a CON review before contemplating reorganization, not afterwards. Thus, reorganization
can be structured to minimize the possibility of CON review of future projects.
Once a CON has been issued, the SHPDA is responsible for periodically reviewing the progress of the CON applicant in implementing the project. 5s Failure to implement the project as proposed could result in withdrawal of the CON. Here too,
management may be confronting unpleasant barriers which restrict
its progress. Most states, however, do not have the capacity to
monitor CON projects. Rather, they have placed the burden on the
CON applicant to inform the state as to progress in meeting the
timetable for implementation and for conformity with the project
description as approved in the CON.
57. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 448.701(5) (Purdon Supp. 1985). This section provides
for the review of major medical equipment not owned by or located in a health care facility
which will serve hospital inpatients. Id.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 123.410(18) (1985).
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Major changes made to a project during implementation could
result in development of a project different from that as originally
approved. The federal regulations require review of such changes
and, consequently, many states have developed separate mechanisms to conduct such reviews.59 With most projects, however,
some changes will occur throughout implementation. These may
result from unanticipated design problems during construction, or
from a host of factors over which management should have some
decision-making flexibility without having to receive further approvals. Unfortunately, some SHPDAs have adopted all-encompassing regulations for the review of changes, thereby severely restricting management flexibility. Again, using Pennsylvania for the
example, approval is required for all changes, even those which
may have only "relatively insignificant consequences. "60 The types
of changes most often encountered relate to the cost and financing
of the project, the scope of the project, and changes in the bed
complement of a facility.
Many states recognize that cost increases are to be expected due
to inflation, work stoppages, and other factors. Those states may
not require a review of minor cost increases, which are usually defined as some percentage of total approved costs. Other states,
however, wanting to guard against cost increases resulting from
poor planning and underestimated construction cost estimates, require a review of all cost increases. Regulators will argue that significant cost increases might bring into question the feasibility of
the project and could jeopardize the facility's ability to complete it.
In order to avoid CON review of cost increases, some facilities
reallocate or reduce the cost of individual project components,
thereby holding total costs within the total approved amounts.
This practice, while often not carefully monitored by the SHPDAs,
can significantly alter the nature of an approved project. Some
states have sought to prohibit such cost reallocations and will subject such changes to further CON review. Careful planning in preparing the CON application is, therefore, essential.
Other changes to a project may also require additional CON review. Most states require some review if there is a change in the
construction square footage or design, a change in the bed capac59. 42 C.F.R. § 404(d) (1985). The Pennsylvania Department of Health requires applicants to notify the Department of any proposed project changes. 28 PA. ADMIN. CODE §
401.5(1) (Shepard's 1984). The Department must approve the changes before the applicant
can proceed with the project. Id.
60. 28 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 401.5(l)(5) (Shepard's 1984).
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ity, a change in movable or fixed equipment, a change in the the
scope of services, or a change in the mode of financing. A CON is
required for refinancing where the capital costs associated with the
refinancing exceed the applicable capital expenditure threshold.
Refinancing may be necessary prior to a reorganization in order to
overcome restrictive covenants that would prohibit the transfer of
assets and other aspects of the reorganization. Changes in location
may also be reviewable. The nature of the review is likely to vary
from an administrative review to a full review depending on the
degree to which changes affect the nature of the project.
The review of changes in bed capacity can be particularly troublesome. Changes of more than 10 beds or 10% of total bed capacity
are subject to CON review. Consistent with the incentives of the
Medicare and Medicaid payment policy described above, many
hospitals are seeking to realign their bed complement and adjust it
to the changing services of the facility. Hospitals so acting may
find unduly restrictive CON barriers. Federal regulations authorize
capital expenditures associated with increases or decreases of up to
10 beds or 10% of bed capacity during a two year period without
obtaining a CON. Similarly, capital expenditures associated with a
relocation of beds or a redistribution among various categories of
beds by up to 10 beds or 10%, whichever is less, are also authorized without acquiring a CON.6 1 It is not clear, however, whether a
facility having exercised the right to increase capacity will then be
able to relocate or redistribute up to 10 beds in the same two year
period without first obtaining a CON. There may be a wide variation in policy among the states on this issue. A careful review of
state requirements is thus necessary because this provision also
leaves much to the discretion of the SHPDAs for interpretation.
D.

Remaining Competitive in a Regulatory Environment

The extensive coverage of CON programs illustrates the difficulty facing hospital management in its effort to respond to the
changing incentives of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. CON
regulations create a barrier to achieving the diversification in facilities and services necessary to remain competitive.
To overcome these problems, a vigorous lobbying effort to review
and restructure CON policy and priorities is necessary. The present regulations are too often inconsistent with the incentives of
the reimbursement system. Regulation of activities such as
61.

42 C.F.R. § 123.404(a)(2) (1985).
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refinancings and incidental project changes promotes neither cost
containment nor the efficient delivery of services.
Absent legislative reform, there is no reason to believe that
SHPDAs and HSAs will not continue to apply CON laws broadly
with a restrictive effect on hospital development. Administration of
CON programs should not, however, be allowed to impair the ability of hospitals to offer necessary facilities and services. They
should be given greater opportunity to compete freely in the marketplace which, because of the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
will behave in a more traditional, competitive manner.
IV.

FRAUD AND ABUSE

Hospitals which have employed a variety of methods to increase
admissions and develop new revenue streams are also confronted
with possible violations of the highly restrictive prohibitions of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs against fraud and abuse.6 2 In an
effort to generate referrals and other business, many hospitals and
other health-related enterprises have established more formalized
links to physicians, physician groups, and other suppliers of goods
and services. Hospitals, for example, will establish business relationships, such as joint ventures, with groups of physicians in the
hope of increasing admissions by those physicians. While such
joint venture arrangements are common in the business world, the
regulatory restrictions of the fraud and abuse laws applicable to
the health care industry lead to peculiar difficulties in structuring
and operating a health care joint venture.
Government pressure to reduce the overall cost of health care
services brought about the cost-saving measures, including PPS,
that have been discussed above. Most of those cost containment
efforts focus on ways to slow or limit unnecessary development.
Similarly, vigorous review of the billing practices and business relationships between physicians and other providers, and even prosecution where appropriate, is also perceived by Congress and government officials as providing substantial cost savings to the
taxpayer.
The Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Amendments,"
first enacted by Congress in 1972, provide the specific statutory
62. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h (1982).
63. For a discussion of the prospective payment reimbursement system, see supra
notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h(n) (1982).
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authority for defining "fraud" and "abuse" and for prosecuting
physicians and other health care providers. 5 Activities specifically
proscribed by the amendments constitute criminal "fraud." Activities of a practitioner that do not rise to the level of criminality, but
which nevertheless result in unnecessary expenditures by the
Medicare or Medicaid Programs, constitute "abuse."6
The amendments prohibit: (1) making false statements in connection with an application for benefits or payments; (2) failure to
disclose any event affecting the rights to benefits or payments
where there is an intent to defraud the Medicare or Medicaid programs; (3) conversion of any benefit or payment other than for the
use of the beneficiary; and (4) receipt, payment, or solicitation of
any remuneration such as a kickback, bribe, or rebate in exchange
for the referral of a patient covered by the Medicare or Medicaid
67
programs.
Criminal prosecutions of physicians for Medicare and Medicaid
fraud, and suspension of physicians from participation in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, have increased dramatically in
recent years. The increase in fraud and abuse prosecutions is directly related to the soaring cost of health care. Jail sentences are
imposed more and more frequently. No one would question the importance of eliminating outright fraud and abuse. Numerous examples can be cited. A Kentucky physician received a one-year jail
sentence for billing Medicare and Medicaid for sonograms, x-rays,
blood and other tests that were never performed.6 8 An audacious
Texas physician, already in jail for Medicare fraud, continued to
use his provider number to bill Medicare for treatments of fictitious ailments using names of cellmates as patients.6
The prohibition against remuneration in exchange for a referral,
however, raises criminal implications for what otherwise appear to
be normal business transactions. When applied to specific situations where participants in a joint venture may be generating increased Medicare and Medicaid referrals and receiving some form
of financial benefit from an otherwise legitimate joint venture activity, the prohibitions of this provision are highly ambiguous. A
more careful analysis of this provision is thus necessary.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b), 1396(h) (1982).
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATOR GENERAL, DEP'T. OF HEALTH

April 1984-Sept. 1984, 23 (1984).
Id. at 24.
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Known as the "anti-kickback" or "illegal remuneration" provision, this section of the fraud and abuse amendments could provide a basis for prosecution of hospitals and other participants in
joint venture arrangements. It reads as follows:
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly
or covertly, in cash or in kind(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under this title, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing or ordering any good, facility, service,
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under
this title,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under this title, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under this title,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.70

There are two exceptions:
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of
services or other entity under this title if the reduction in price is
properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or
charges made by the provider or entity under this title; and
(B) any amount paid by an employer to any employee (who has a
bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of covered items or services."

How do these provisions impact on the joint venture or diversified business activities of hospitals and other health care entities?
The most common method by which hospitals hope to increase admissions is to strengthen relationships with potential admitting
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)(1), (2) (1982).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(3) (1982).
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physicians. They want to encourage new admissions and they hope
to do so by giving physicians an opportunity to share in the business that is generated. Hospitals, therefore, have entered into joint
venture arrangements with physicians and together they have organized and operated diagnostic centers, home health agencies,
ambulatory surgical centers, and even parking garages. They are
also becoming partners in developing PPOs, HMOs, and insurance
companies.
Similarly, other health-related enterprises are entering joint ventures with hospitals and physicians to increase their business. Durable Medical Equipment (DME) suppliers, for example, have established home health agencies in joint ventures with both
hospitals and physicians in hopes of thereby providing an outlet
for the sale of additional DME commonly used by patients served
by those agencies.
These arrangements have the hidden potential to violate the illegal remuneration provision. For example, does the receipt of profits from a joint venture home health agency to whom a hospital
refers patients constitute a kickback or illegal remuneration?
Many lawyers think not, but there is no definite answer.
Addressing some of these issues, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), in a letter to the fiscal intermediaries which
administer the processing of claims for the Medicare program, advised of potential illegal "fee generating opportunities."7 2 In the
example used by HCFA, DME companies paid "finder" or "referral fees" to health professionals such as discharge planners, social
workers, or respiratory therapists, who were in a position to direct
patients needing DME to a particular supplier. 3 Payment of such
fees specifically designed to induce referrals is clearly illegal.
The letter then suggests that more subtle arrangements might
also be illegal.7 4 It cites instances where therapists refer patients to
a DME supplier, and pursuant to an arrangement, receive payments from the supplier for setting up the DME equipment, performing monthly maintenance on the equipment, and instructing
the patient in the use of the equipment. 5 Some suppliers and ther72. Intermediary Letter, No. 8-84-9, Payments to Respiratory Therapists by Durable
Medical Equipment Suppliers and the Illegal Remuneration Provisions of the Social Security Act, 11984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,127 (Sept.
1984).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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apists have argued that such arrangements amount to no more
than a bona fide employer-employee relationship and are therefore
legal pursuant to the exception. 76 Others have argued that payments under such arrangements are made only for legitimate services rendered and are not made in return for referrals. 77 HCFA,
on the other hand, stated that although the fee paid for the services actually rendered might not have been illegal, the opportunity to generate that fee is or very likely could be illegal because it
is offered to induce a referral. 7 This would constitute an illegal
fee-generating opportunity. According to HCFA, payment or receipt of any remuneration, overt or covert, in kind or in cash intended to induce a referral is illegal. 79 Thus, the supplier who induces patient referrals by offering therapists fee-generating
opportunities is offering illegal remuneration." The opportunity
becomes a form of remuneration.
The implications of HCFA's position should frighten any hospital or physician contemplating a joint venture in which either or
both parties might anticipate increased business and profits. On a
similar note, do arrangements by hospitals to provide physicians
with clinic space, lab facilities and other opportunities which enhance the hospital/physician relationship, constitute illegal remuneration if referrals are made to the hospital by those physicians?
In a common example, the hospital will construct a medical office
building to attract physicians in hopes of strengthening the hospital's patient referral base. Is this an offer of illegal remuneration?
In its strictest application, this indeed could be a technical violation of the illegal remuneration provision. Suppose the hospital
leases the space to physicians for less than fair market rental
value? What is the result if there is no obligation by the physicians
to make referrals? What happens to a hospital which recruits physicians by offering a salary guarantee and other benefits? In rural
areas, this latter practice has been accepted by HCFA to assure
that otherwise underserved communities have access to health care
services. 8 1 Does this imply a different result for urban areas?
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. HCFA's position was that a supplier who induces patient referrals by offering
therapists the fee-generating opportunity was offering an illegal remuneration, even if the
therapist received no more than his or her usual fee. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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For the most part, the hospitals themselves have not been the
target of fraud and abuse investigations. Nevertheless, the examples demonstrate the complexity of the illegal remuneration provision. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that hospital practices
will not be given more careful scrutiny in the future.
HCFA's position on illegal fee-generating opportunities has not
been well received. In response, the position was recently modified
so as to permit evaluation of these opportunities on a case by case
basis.8 2 Factors taken into consideration to determine whether feegenerating opportunities are illegal include, for example, consideration as to whether the respiratory therapists provide services to all
patients of the DME supplier or only those referred by the therapist; whether there are unusual geographic or medical reasons for
using the therapists who make the referrals; and whether the practices for installation and maintenance of equipment by other suppliers in the area are consistent with the practices under
question. 3
The modified position of HCFA, however, provides little comfort
in the face of a decision by the United States Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Greber.8 4 Dr. Greber, a cardiologist,
owned and operated a company which provided cardiac diagnostic
services."' The company paid consultation fees for interpretations
provided by all physicians who referred patients for testing.8 6 Both
the trial court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the consultation fees constituted illegal remuneration, a holding
which appears consistent with the illegal fee-generating opportunity described by HCFA.8 7 The Third Circuit stated:
Defendant contends that the [trial judge's] charge was erroneous. He insists that absent a showing that the only purpose behind the fee was to
improperly induce future services, compensating a physician for services actually rendered could not be a violation of the statute.
The government argues that Congress intended to combat financial incentives to physicians for ordering particular services patients did not require.
The language and purpose of the statute support the government's view.
Even if the physician performs some service for the money received, the

82. Program Memo. to Carriers, No. B-85-2, Medicare/Medicaid:Finders and Referral Fees to Therapists, [1985 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,544 (Apr. 1985).
83. Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.

760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 69-70.
Id.
Id. at 72.
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potential for unnecessary drain on the Medicare system remains. The statute is aimed at the inducement factor.88

This is an ominous decision. However, prosecution for this violation may not have commenced if this had been the only violation
at issue. This violation could have been treated as a harmless technical matter that otherwise would not have deserved notice but for
the fact that numerous other more serious violations were also present in the Greber case. The defendant Greber had clearly made
false statements in seeking reimbursement for services that were
medically unnecessary.
We have all been taught that hard cases make bad law. The
Greber case must have been a hard case indeed. It will now be even
more difficult for lawyers to offer definitive advise on arrangements
such as these which may arise routinely as health care clients increasingly undertake joint venture arrangements. It is incumbent
upon lawyers to provide practical advice. It is equally incumbent
upon those responsible for enforcing these criminal provisions to
exempt reasonable business practices from prosecution as technical
89
violations of the fraud and abuse laws.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the Department of Justice will
recognize reasonable practices. In October of 1985, it advised the
Office of Inspector General that it could not inform the public that
those engaged in certain practices that did not increase costs to the
Medicare and Medicaid programs would not be prosecuted." The
two activities at issue were both the waiver of Part A co-payments
by hospitals as a marketing tool to increase admissions, and the
case of vendor-paid administrative fees by hospital group purchasing organizations.9 In the view of the Department of Justice, those
88. Id. at 71.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g) (1982). The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is the federal agency charged with the task of enforcing the Medicaid and Medicare fraud and abuse
amendments. Id. Each state has its own state Medicaid Fraud Control Unit which is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all violations of applicable state laws pertaining to fraud in the administration of the state Medicaid plan. 42 C.F.R. § 455.300(f) (1984).
These units are also responsible for prosecuting allegations of abuse or neglect of patients
who reside in facilities which receive payments under the plan. Id.
90. Letter from Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice to Richard T. Kusserow, Inspector General, Department of Health
and Human Services (October 30, 1985)(discussing current health care marketing practices
dealing with the routine waiver of Medicare coinsurance and deductible amounts and the
payment by a supplier to an agent of a group of hospitals of a percentage of gross receipts
resulting from the referral of hospital business).
91. Id.
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activities technically violate the illegal remuneration provision."
The Justice Department does, however, suggest that it will examine reasonableness on a case by case basis. 3 A determination to
prosecute represents a policy judgment that the fundamental interests of society require that criminal laws be applied to a particular set of circumstances. Such a determination must recognize that
serious violations of federal law must be prosecuted, but also that
prosecution entails profound consequences for the accused whether
or not a conviction ultimately results.
In general, an analysis of whether a given joint venture violates
the anti-remuneration provisions should take into consideration
the legislative purpose of the anti-fraud and abuse rules and
whether the activities run counter to that purpose. The joint venture should have a well-defined and bona fide business purpose.
Each participant should make a reasonable contribution to the
venture with respect to capitalization, funding of operations, performance of legitimate services, and sharing of economic risks.
Each participant's share of the profits should be consistent with
his respective contributions and risks. Profits should not be based
upon the volume of business or referrals generated by either of the
participants. Finally, the venture should not lead to increased costs
to the Medicare or Medicaid programs. With these principles in
mind, the cautious lawyer should be able to structure joint venture
arrangements with a fair degree of confidence that they will not be
deemed violations of the fraud and abuse laws.
CONCLUSION

The health care industry faces a rapidly changing marketplace.
The new payment policies of the Medicare and Medicaid benefit
92. Id. Assistant Attorney General Trott wrote that waiver of coinsurance was technically an illegal activity for a number of reasons. First, the existence of coinsurance is necessary to deter patients from seeking unnecessary hospitalization under the new prospective
payment system. Second, simply because other mechanisms act as disincentives to overutilization by health care consumers, the necessity of the coinsurance payment is not negated.
Third, the Department of Justice does not have the authority to change rules Congress has
mandated applicable to federal programs. Fourth, the Inspector General has no authority to
immunize conduct from prosecution which is clearly a crime under the law. Finally, Trott
wrote that the Department of Justice does not have the resources to prosecute every violation of the Criminal Code, and, therefore, many prosecutions represent a policy judgment.
He did not believe, however, that it was within his discretion to legalize certain conduct. For
the same reasons, Trott also wrote that the Department of Justice was unwilling to take the
position that obtaining supply discounts was legal in all cases, as it would be tantamount to
saying a crime is not a crime. Id.
93. Id.
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programs have introduced new incentives by which cost control
will hopefully be achieved. The results so far have been promising.
Somewhere along the way, however, other pre-existing programs
must also change. They must be adapted to the new payment policies to relieve hospitals and other industry participants from restrictive regulatory barriers and prohibitive laws that frustrate appropriate development.

